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Abstract
The design of data markets has gained in importance as firms increasingly use pre-
dictions from machine learning models to make their operations more effective, yet need
to externally acquire the necessary training data to fit such models. A property of such
markets that has been given limited consideration thus far is the externality faced by a firm
when data is allocated to other, competing firms. Addressing this is likely necessary for
progress towards the practical implementation of such markets. In this work, we consider
the case with n competing firms and a monopolistic data seller. We demonstrate that
modeling the utility of firms solely through the increase in prediction accuracy experienced
reduces the complex, combinatorial problem of allocating and pricing multiple data sets
to an auction of a single digital (freely replicable) good. Crucially, this is what enables
us to model the negative externalities experienced by a firm resulting from other firms’
allocations. We obtain forms of the welfare-maximizing and revenue-maximizing auctions
for such settings. We highlight how the form of the firms’ private information – whether
they know the externalities they exert on others or that others exert on them – affects the
structure of the optimal mechanisms. We find that in all cases, the optimal allocation
rules turn out to be single thresholds (one per firm), in which the seller allocates all
information or none of it to a firm. We note the framework and results introduced hold
more broadly for the auction of digital goods with externalities.
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1 Introduction
Access to data or information is becoming the key differentiating factor for firms as they
increasingly train and deploy Machine Learning (ML) models to improve their operations.
Such data frequently needs to be acquired from specialized external sources (e.g. information
about customers, satellite images, weather forecasts), which has led to the proliferation of
data services that specialize in providing such information. Moreover, all firms exist in
competitive structures, and the way such data is allocated and sold should clearly depend
on the particulars of the competition these firms engage in. However externalities amongst
those purchasing data has been given limited consideration in the literature thus far. The key
features that drive the design of allocation and payment mechanisms (which we henceforth
call data auctions) for such a setting stems from the nature of data itself: (i) it is freely
replicable and so there is no inherent scarcity of it; (ii) it is intrinsically combinatorial, i.e.,
different datasets (training features for a ML model) sold are bound to have correlation in
signal, and so even parameterizing the externality a firm faces from a competing firm getting
allocated some subsets of data is in itself a challenging proposition (see Section 2 for details).
The goal of this work is to be a first step towards a tractable formulation of a data auction
with externalities. Two desirable properties of such a formulation are: (i) it captures the
preferences of a firm for datasets (including externalities) in a small number of parameters,
without undue dependence on the number and nature of datasets on sale; (ii) it lends itself to
a description of the optimal mechanisms with respect to revenue and social welfare.
1.1 Contributions
A Model For Data Auctions with Externalities. We build on the formulation of
[ADS19] and demonstrate that by modeling the utility of firms solely through the increase in
prediction accuracy experienced, it reduces the complex, combinatorial problem of allocating
and pricing multiple data sets to an auction of a single digital (freely replicable) good. The
crucial extension to the formulation of [ADS19] is that we model the negative externalities
experienced by a firm resulting from other firms’ allocations (see Section 2.3). Though a priori
one would expect the number of parameters to grow with the number of available datasets,
our modeling assumptions lets us summarize each firm’s preferences by an n-dimensional
vector, where n is the number of firms.
Welfare and Revenue Maximization. We choose to analyze two models which differ in
the form of the firms’ private information – whether they know the externalities they exert
on others or in contrast, the externalities that others exert on them. We obtain forms of
the welfare-maximizing auction and revenue-maximizing auction for the two settings. A key
property of the derived mechanisms is that in all cases, the optimal allocations turn out to be
single price thresholds (one per firm), in which the seller allocates all information or none
of it to a firm. These thresholds can be expressed as simple functions balancing the value a
firm receives from a data allocation with the externality that allocation causes on other firms
(see Table 1 in the conclusion for a summary). Thus, despite the combinatorial nature of the
problem, the characterization of the optimal allocations is such that it suffices to consider the
extremal allocations; for each firm, either all data is allocated or none of it is.
3
Learning. Finally, we consider the situation where the type distribution of the bidders is
unknown and has to be learned. We show that the specific form of the optimal auctions
derived in this paper lends itself to learning this unknown type distribution using results from
stochastic online optimization. In particular we present a no-regret algorithm with respect to
the optimal-revenue mechanism (see Proposition E.2 in Appendix E).
1.2 Related Work
Economics of Information Goods. There is a rich literature on mechanism design for
buying or selling data, in which the value of data is derived from its informativeness in a
learning task. For procurement auctions, [GR11] consider a setting in which the buyer wishes
to estimate a population statistic while the sellers experience a cost due to privacy loss. In
[RS12], the authors consider a similar problem but assume a known prior on the sellers’ costs.
A budget-feasible regression problem is considered in [HIM14] and [ACHW15] consider an
online learning setting. More recently, [BB19, AMMO19] consider the externalities associated
with selling data, for example when information about a given seller leaks from the data sold
by a different seller.
In [BCTS19, AP86], the authors consider a related problem of selling information goods
in a competitive environment and find that the optimal selling strategy crucially depends on
the form of the competition, thus motivating studying the effect of interdependent valuation
functions. Contrary to them, we consider an auction setting instead of assuming that the
seller has complete knowledge of the competition structure.
Externalities in Auctions. The second line of work related to the present paper studies
the question of designing auctions in the presence of externalities. The seminal papers [JMS96]
and [JMS99] study the same multidimensional additive externality model as the one we present
here, and our analysis draws from their results. We also mention the survey [JM06] by the
first two of these authors as a useful reference. Many papers consider a similar additive
model, but often assume that externality parameters are public [AC08, Bro13] or do not
depend on the identity of the competitor [BDP17] essentially reducing the auction to the
single dimensional setting. Closest to our work is [DP11] which extended the setting of
[JMS96] to the situation where K copies of the same indivisible item are being sold. However,
their focus was on quantifying the effect of changing the parameter K. Finally, we mention
[HIMM13, ZWWB18] which consider single-dimensional non-additive models of externalities
yielding tractable auctions.
1.3 Organization of Paper
In Section 2, we motivate and formulate the utility model of the firms and the auction
design setup. In Section 3, we collect known characterizations of incentive compatibility and
individual rationality relevant for our setting. In Section 4 and Section 5 we describe the
social-welfare and revenue maximizing mechanisms respectively. We conclude by summarizing
our main findings.
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2 Model
Basics of Model. There exists a single monopolistic data seller that has access to a (possibly
combinatorial) “information set”, S (e.g., S could be a collection of M training features). Let
there be N := [n] firms which engage with this data seller to increase the prediction accuracy
of some quantity of interest (e.g., forecasting demand of a good).
2.1 A Succinct Bidding Language for Data Auctions with Externalities
Key Challenge – Combinatorial Nature of Data. The key challenge in designing such
data auctions stems from the potentially combinatorial nature of the information set S, on
sale (e.g., M training features). For example, it is likely the information in a particular
feature sold is likely to be highly correlated with other features also sold by the data seller.
Hence, without further structure, the number of parameters required to capture the valuation
function of each firm (including the externalities due to other firms) is in general going to
be exponential in the size of the information set S. For example in the case where there are
M features on sale, we would require at least n × 2M quantities to even parameterize the
valuation of each participating firm, likely rendering this auction intractable.
Towards Feasibility – Existence of a Prediction Gain Function. Towards a more
feasible auction design, we build on the model of [ADS19] and notice that in the setting where
firms aim to increase prediction accuracy, it is natural to make the modeling assumption
that their valuation for data does not come from specific data sets on sale, but rather from
an increase in prediction accuracy of a quantity of interest (along with that of other firms
when there are externalities). Hence, we assume that each firm i ∈ N is parametrized by
a “Gain Function”, Gi : S → [0, 1], which is a function mapping the information set, S, to
some quantity that defines prediction accuracy (e.g., 1-(Normalized) Mean Squared Error,
R2-Accuracy). Note, implicit in Gi are the particulars of the ML model that is trained
and used to make predictions, through the acquired information. Below we list two natural
properties we impose on the gain function Gi for each firm i ∈ N .
Property 2.1 (Monotonicity). For any two subsets S1 ⊆ S2 ⊆ S, Gi(S1) ≤ Gi(S2).
Property 2.2 (Normalization). We assume that Gi is normalized such that Gi(S) = 1 and
Gi(∅) = 0. Here ∅ denotes the empty set, i.e., no information is allocated to firm i.
Property 2.1 makes the (mild) assumption that the gain function Gi is monotone in
the amount of information allocated. Property 2.2 is simply to normalize the various gain
functions, and is without loss of generality.
2.2 Allocation of Data
Firm Allocations Are in [0, 1]. Consider a subset Si ⊆ S of data allocated to firm i and
define xi = Gi(Si) the resulting gain in prediction accuracy. Because of Property 2.2, we
have xi ∈ [0, 1] where xi = 1 denotes Firm i getting allocated the entire information set S,
and xi = 0 denotes Firm i getting allocated no information. Further note that by Property
2.1, Firm i’s utility will be non-decreasing in xi. Let x := (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ [0, 1]n refer to the
allocation vector to the n firms.
5
All-Or-Nothing Data Allocations Suffice. Note, since the domain of S can potentially
be a discrete combinatorial set (e.g. the power set of M training features on sale), Gi can
only take on a discrete set of values in the range [0, 1], leading to possible discontinuities
in the allocation. We relax the problem and consider allocations in the continuous domain
[0, 1], i.e. we will treat in the analysis the allocation x as being able to take any value in this
domain. However, if these discontinuities are large (e.g. the information set S consists of a
small number of disparate training features), there may not always exist a set Si ⊆ S such
that Gi(Si) equals the allocation prescribed by the mechanism, a possible stumbling block.
One could get around this by considering probabilistic allocations (see below) or by adding
noise to the data (see [ADS19]). However, we find that even though we relax the problem to
the continuous setting, it turns out that the optimal allocations (both for welfare and revenue
maximization), are single price thresholds (one per firm), above which the seller allocates all
information and below which, allocates no information to a firm. So the mechanism remains
realizable for the original problem with discrete allocations and we conveniently avoid the
issue of these discontinuities by having to only implement the extremal allocations, Gi(S)
(i.e., xi = 1) and Gi(∅) (i.e., xi = 0).
Extension of Framework to Digital Goods. We note the framework above allows for
our results to hold more broadly for auctions for digital goods (i.e., freely replicable goods)
with externalities. In particular, if an indivisible digital good, denoted as G, is auctioned,
we can interpret xi ∈ [0, 1] as Firm i receiving the good G with probability xi and receiving
nothing with probability 1− xi.
2.3 Modeling Valuation with Additively Separable Externalities.
In [ADS19], the authors make the simplifying assumption that a firm’s valuation for data is
linear in the gain in accuracy, i.e., there exists a vi ∈ R≥0 (the firm’s private type), such that
a firm’s valuation for accuracy is given by viGi (or vixi in our set-up), i.e., a firm’s valuation
is simply a scaling of the gain in prediction accuracy experienced. For the setting we consider,
where firms experience an externality due to increases in the prediction accuracy of competing
firms, a natural extension of this model is where Firm i’s valuation for i ∈ N is given as
νi(x) = vi · xi −
∑
j∈N\i
ηi←jxj . (2.1)
Here, vi ∈ R≥0 is the value that Firm i gets from being allocated xi (equivalent to the
definition of vi in [ADS19]). In addition, ηi←j ∈ R≥0 is the negative externality caused by
Firm j on Firm i when Firm j is allocated xj = 1. For example, this quantity could be the
decrease in Firm i’s net profit when Firm j is allocated the entire information set versus when
it is not (see also [JMS96, Section I]). We collect the vector of externalities exerted on Firm i
by other firms as ηi← := (ηi←j)j∈N\i so that its valuation can be written more concisely as
νi(x) = vi · xi − 〈ηi←,x−i〉 where 〈·, ·〉 denotes the usual inner product.
Remark 2.3 (Key Modeling Assumption). Equation (2.1) captures the main modeling as-
sumption made, that the competition structure the firms engage in is additively separable.
This could be thought of as a first order approximation of a general valuation function νi
with respect to x, the allocation vector. This model of externality does not capture more
complicated non-linear competition structures such as νi(x) = vi 1{xi > xj : ∀j ∈ N\i}.
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2.4 Firm Private Type
Note from (2.1) that Firm i’s valuation is a function of (vi,ηi←). However in reality, depending
on the particulars of the competition structure the firms engage in, the private information a
firm has might differ. We call this private information the firm’s “type”. We consider two
natural scenarios:
Scenario 1: Knowledge of Externalities Exerted By Others. Firm i’s private type
is (vi,ηi←). In this case, Firm i has knowledge of the externalities that other firms cause on
it.
Scenario 2: Knowledge of Externalities Exerted Onto Others. Firm i’s private
type is (vi,η←i), where η←i := (ηj←i)j∈N\i. In this case, Firm i has knowledge of the
externalities that it causes on other firms.
We find that this difference in what defines the private type of a firm, though subtle,
crucially affects the form of the optimal allocation and payment functions.
Bidder Type Spaces and Bid Spaces. Going forward, we use the standard auction
terminology and refer to firms as bidders. We denote bidder i’s private type as ti ∈ Ti, where
Ti denotes the type space of bidder i. Thus, in Scenario 1, we have ti := (vi,ηi←) ∈ Rn≥0,
while in Scenario 2, we have ti := (vi,η←i) ∈ Rn≥0. We abuse notation and let ti refer to
both kinds of private types as it will be clear from context for the remainder of the paper.
We further assume the type values lie in bounded ranges: vi ∈ [v
¯i
, v¯i] and ηij ∈ [η
¯ij
, η¯ij ] for
i ∈ N, j ∈ N\i, and let η
¯i←
:= (η
¯i←j
)j∈N\i, and η¯i← := (η¯i←j)j∈N\i. Let T :=
∏
i∈N Ti. A
vector of types from all the bidders is denoted as t ∈ T . We denote t−i as the vector of all
types other than bidder i.
We assume bidders are rational, selfish agents who act to maximize their utilities in a
given auction setting. It is possible that participating in the auction, i.e. submitting a valid
bid, receiving an allocation, and making a payment, may leave bidders worse off than simply
not participating. To give bidders the option of non-participation, we define the bid spaces
Bi := Ti ∪ {∅} and B := Πi∈NBi. Then a bidder can report any type in Ti, but can also
choose to not participate in the auction by reporting ∅.
Throughout, we use the convention that a “hat” letter denotes a quantity reported by the
bidders, as opposed to the “true” realization of the same quantity. For example, ti denotes
the (true) type of bidder i while tˆi denotes her bid (i.e. reported type). Similarly, t−i and tˆ−i
denote respectively the true types and reported types of all bidders but i.
Prior Distribution of Bidder Types. For certain cases we consider, making a distribu-
tional assumption on the private types of bidders will be necessary. For those settings, we let
the bidders’ private types ti be drawn independently from commonly known distributions Fi
on Ti. Let fi be the corresponding density functions for Fi, f =
∏
i∈N fi, and F =
∏
i∈N Fi
be the joint distribution function of t on T , likewise for the individual parameters vi and ηi←j ,
we denote the corresponding marginal density and distribution functions by fvi , fηi←j , and
Fvi , Fηi←j , respectively.
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2.5 Auction Design Setup
By the revelation principle [Mye81], it suffices to consider incentive compatible mechanisms
where bidders directly bid their type. The auction design problem consists of designing the
following two functions to maximize social welfare or the seller’s revenue:
• an allocation function x : B → [0, 1]n;
• a payment function p : B → (R≥0)n.
In short, given a vector of bids tˆ ∈ T from the bidders, x(tˆ) is the resulting vector of allocations
and p(tˆ) is the vector of payments required of the bidders. We abuse notation and let x
denote both the vector of allocations and the function, which maps bids to this allocation
vector. We similarly abuse notation for p.
We assume bidder’s have quasilinear net utility from participating in the auction. That is,
given a allocation and payment vectors x and p, respectively, and true types t ∈ T , bidder i’s
utility is
ui(x,p; t) := νi(x)− pi = vi · xi −
∑
j∈N\i
ηi←jxj − pi .
Remark 2.4 (Key Difference From Standard Auction Set-Ups). The key difference from
standard single-item auction setups is that for digital goods, such as data, there is no
feasibility constraint on the allocation function x(·). In particular, we do not require that
the sum of the allocations (
∑n
i=1 xi), is less than or equal to one. The absence of this
feasibility constraint is key in obtaining a simple structure for the optimal auctions despite it
being a multi-dimensional mechanism design problem (i.e., each bidder is parameterized by a
n-dimensional vector).
Outside Option. When a bidder chooses not to participate in the auction, the auctioneer
cannot charge the bidder any price nor ‘dump’ any goods on the bidder. That is, we have
the restriction that xi(tˆ) = 0 and pi(tˆ) = 0 whenever tˆi = ∅. Note that even if a given bidder
chooses not to participate in the auction, allocations to the other, participating bidders can
still affect her utility through negative externalities. Thus, it will be necessary to specify what
the auction does when subsets of bidders don’t participate. However, since we are interested
in finding an equilibrium where all bidders participate (and bid truthfully), it suffices for us
to explicitly define the mechanism under single-bidder deviations from equilibrium and the
equilibrium itself. That is, we seek allocation and payment rules x(tˆ) and p(tˆ) when at most
one component of t is ∅. Bidder i’s utility when she does not participate and all remaining
bidders N\i do participate depends only on others’ bids and the true underlying types, and is
called bidder i’s “outside option”. Given a type vector t ∈ T and a vector of bids tˆ−i from
other bidders, the utility of bidder i in her outside option is given by
ui
(
x(tˆi = ∅, tˆ−i),p(tˆi = ∅, tˆ−i); t
)
= −
∑
j∈N\i
ηi←jxj(tˆi = ∅, tˆ−i) . (2.2)
3 Truthfulness and Participation Constraints
In Section 3.1, we define incentive compatibility (IC) and individual rationality (IR) conditions.
In Section 3.2, we then provide relevant characterizations of the mechanisms satisfying these
IC and IR constraints, which depend on the form of bidders’ private types.
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3.1 Definitions of IC and IR Mechanisms
Ex-Post Constraints. We first consider ex-post truthfulness and participation constraints.
Definition 3.1 (Dominant Strategy Incentive Compatibility). A mechanism (x,p) is Domi-
nant Strategy Incentive Compatible (DSIC) if for all type vectors t, tˆ ∈ T and bidder i ∈ N
ui
(
x(ti, tˆ−i), pi(ti, tˆ−i); t
) ≥ ui(x(tˆ), pi(tˆ); t) .
Definition 3.2 (Ex-Post Individual Rationality). A mechanism (x,p) is ex-post Individually
Rational (ex-post IR) if for every type vector t ∈ T and bidder i ∈ N
ui
(
x(t), pi(t); t
) ≥ ui(x(∅, t−i), pi(∅, t−i); t) .
Dominant strategy incentive compatibility expresses that no matter what the true types
are and what other players bid, a bidder cannot strictly increase her net utility by bidding
untruthfully. Ex-post individual rationality expresses that no matter what the true types
are, in a situation where all other bidders participate and bid truthfully, it is better for each
bidder to report truthfully than to not participate. These two properties combined imply that
participating and reporting truthfully is a dominant strategy equilibrium of the game induced
by the mechanism.
Interim Constraints. In situations where types a drawn from a know prior distribution
and bidders reason in expectation over other bidder’s private types conditioned on their own
observed types, we consider interim relaxations of the IC and IR definitions.
To this end, define Vi(tˆi; ti) := E
[
ui
(
x(tˆi, t−i), pi(tˆi, t−i
)
; t)
∣∣ ti] to be the interim expected
utility of bidder i ∈ N if she bids tˆi ∈ Bi while having a true type ti ∈ Ti, and all other
bidders bid their type truthfully. Note that the expectation is taken over a random realization
t ∼ F conditioned on the event that bidder’s i type is ti.
Definition 3.3 (Bayes–Nash Incentive Compatibility). A mechanism (x,p) is Bayes–Nash
Incentive Compatible (BNIC) if for all types ti, tˆi ∈ Ti and bidder i ∈ N , Vi(ti; ti) ≥ Vi(tˆi; ti).
Definition 3.4 (Interim Individual Rationality). A mechanism (x,p) satisfies interim Indi-
vidual Rationality (interim IR) if for every type ti ∈ Ti and bidder i ∈ N , Vi(ti; ti) ≥ Vi(∅; ti).
3.2 Characterizations of IC and IR Mechanisms
An important step towards elucidating the solution structure of the welfare-maximizing and
revenue-maximizing mechanisms is to obtain a characterization of the IC and IR constraints.
Since our valuation model has the same form as the one in [JMS96, JMS99], we rely on the
characterizations found in these papers, and state them below for completeness.
3.2.1 Characterizations in Scenario 1
For ease of notation, given bidder i’s type ti = (vi,ηi←), let us define the corresponding type
vector t†i ∈ Rn by t†i = viei −
∑
j∈N\i ηi←jej where ek denotes the kth vector of the standard
basis. Note that t†i amounts to a reordering and appropriate negation of ti’s coordinates so
that bidder i’s valuation given allocation vector x can be written as 〈t†i ,x〉 =
∑
k∈N t
†
i,k · xk.
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For each bidder i ∈ N , we define the overall interim allocation function y(i)(t†i ) := E[x(ti, t−i) |
ti] and the interim payment qi(ti) := E[pi(ti, t−i) | ti]. Note that y(i) is a vector field mapping
Ti to [0, 1]
n. Finally, for every bidder i ∈ N , we define the critical type t˚i = (v
¯i
,η
¯i←
), which
will feature in the following IC and IR characterizations.
Proposition 3.5 ([JMS99, Proposition 1]). Suppose bidders’ private types are of the form
ti = (vi,ηi←) for each bidder i ∈ N . Then the mechanism (x,p) is BNIC if and only if for
each bidder i ∈ N :
(i) y(i) is conservative.
(ii) y(i) is monotone, that is
〈
s†i − t†i ,y(i)(s†i )− y(i)(t†i )
〉 ≥ 0 for all si, ti ∈ Ti.
(iii) for each type ti ∈ Ti, the interim payment is given by
qi(ti) =
〈
y(i)(t†i ), t
†
i
〉− ∫ t†i
t˚†i
y(i)(s†i ) · ds†i − Ci , (3.1)
where Ci is an arbitrary integration constant whose value sets Vi(˚ti; t˚i), the interim
utility of bidder i when her type is t˚i = (v
¯ i
,η
¯ i←
).
We also provide the following characterization of interim IR for BNIC mechanisms that
maximize revenue.
Proposition 3.6 (Adapted from [JMS99, Proposition 3]). Suppose private types are of the
form ti = (vi,ηi←) for each bidder i ∈ N . Then a revenue-maximizing BNIC mechanism
satisfies the interim IR constraint Vi(ti; ti) ≥ Vi(∅; ti) if and only if this condition is satisfied
for the critical type t˚i = (v
¯ i
,η
¯ i←
).
The proof of this proposition is in Appendix A.1.
3.2.2 Characterizations in Scenario 2
We now consider the case where the private types are of the form ti = (vi,η←i) for each bidder
i ∈ N . Note that in this scenario, bidder i’s expected outside option utility Vi(∅; ti) does not
depend on ti. For ease of notation, we define the interim allocation yi(tˆi) := E[xi(tˆi, t−i) | ti]
and recall the definition of the interim payment qi(tˆi) := E[pi(tˆi, t−i) | ti].
Proposition 3.7 ([JMS96, Proposition 2]). Assume that private types are of the form
ti = (vi,η←i) for each bidder i ∈ N . The mechanism (x,p) is BNIC if and only if for each
bidder i ∈ N :
(i) there exists a non-decreasing function y˜i : [v
¯ i
, v¯i]→ [0, 1] such that the interim allocation
satisfies yi(vi,η←i) = y˜i(vi) for almost all vi and all η←i ∈
∏
j∈N\i[η
¯ j←i
, η¯j←i].
(ii) the interim payment qi(ti) for each type ti = (vi,η←i) ∈ Ti is given by
qi(ti) = vi · y˜i(vi)−
∫ vi
v
¯ i
y˜i(v)dv −
∑
j∈N\i
E[ηi←j · xj(ti, t−i) | ti]− Ci , (3.2)
where Ci is an arbitrary integration constant.
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Furthermore, if these conditions are satisfied, then Vi(ti; ti) is constant with respect to η←i
for almost every vi ∈ [v
¯ i
, v¯i], and Ci = Vi(v
¯ i
,η←i) for all η←i ∈
∏
j∈N\i[η
¯ j←i
, η¯j←i].
We provide an alternative (arguably simpler) proof of this proposition in Appendix A.2.
Finally, we have the following characterization of interim IR for BNIC mechanisms.
Proposition 3.8. Suppose private types are of the form ti = (vi,η←i) ∈ Ti for each bidder
i ∈ N . Then a BNIC mechanism satisfies the interim IR constraint Vi(ti; ti) ≥ Vi(∅; ti) for
all ti ∈ Ti, if and only if this condition is satisfied for some type of the form (v
¯ i
,η←i), where
η←i ∈
∏
j∈N\i[η
¯ j←i
, η¯j←i].
4 Social Welfare Maximization
In this section, the seller’s problem is to design allocation and payment functions, x(·) and
p(·) that maximize the total social welfare, i.e. the sum of bidder valuations:
SW(x; t) =
∑
i∈N
νi(x) =
∑
i∈N
(
vixi −
∑
j∈N\i
ηi←jxj
)
(4.1)
such that the auction: (i) is incentive compatible; (ii) satisfies individual rationality; (iii)
has no positive transfers, i.e. the seller never pays a bidder to participate in the auction.
We organize this section by the private types of the bidders according to the two scenarios
described in Section 2.4.
4.1 Welfare Maximization in Scenario 1
We first consider the case where the private type of bidder i ∈ N takes the form ti = (vi,ηi←),
i.e. each bidder knows the allocative externalities others cause on her. We instantiate the
Vickrey–Clarke–Groves (VCG) mechanism for this setting and comment on the resulting
allocation and payment functions.
We wish to maximize (4.1) subject to DSIC (Definition 3.1), ex-post IR (Definition 3.2),
and the feasibility constraint that for all i ∈ N, xi ∈ [0, 1] (Section 3.1). To define ex-post IR,
recall that we need to instantiate the outside option, i.e. what occurs if bidder i chooses not
to participate in the auction. Here, we choose the natural outside option, that is to run the
welfare-maximizing auction with the remaining set N\i of bidders.
Efficient Allocation. Note that by rearranging terms, we can express the social welfare
objective (4.1) as
SW(x; t) =
∑
i∈N
vi − ∑
j∈N\i
ηj←i
xi(t) = ∑
i∈N
Wixi(t) (4.2)
where we let Wi := vi −
∑
j∈N\i ηj←i represent the “welfare contribution” of bidder i, that is,
the net contribution to the social welfare, SW, if bidder i were allocated the good. As we
shall see, a constant theme for the efficient and optimal mechanisms studied in this paper is
that Wi, or variants thereof, is the key quantity determining the allocation of bidder i. Since
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(4.2) is linear in the allocations xi, it easily follows that the welfare-maximizing, or efficient,
allocation under the above constraints is simply to allocate whenever Wi is nonnegative, i.e.
xi(t) = 1{Wi ≥ 0} = 1
{
vi −
∑
j∈N\i
ηj←i ≥ 0
}
. (4.3)
As was alluded to in Section 2.5, although xi is only constrained to be in [0, 1], the optimal
allocation turns out to be one of two extremes: either allocate all data or none of it to a
bidder.
IR and the Outside Option. To streamline presentation, let us define the welfare contri-
bution of bidder j when (only) bidder i is chooses to not participate in the auction to be, for
j ∈ N\i,
W ij := vj −
∑
k∈N\{i,j}
ηk←j
Then following the same reasoning above, the welfare maximizing allocation of bidder j in
the absence of bidder i is given by
xj(ti = ∅, t−i) = 1
{
W ij ≥ 0
}
. (4.4)
and the value of bidder i’s outside option utility is thus
ui
(
x(∅, t−i), pi(∅, t−i); t
)
= −
∑
j∈N\i
ηi←jxj(ti = ∅, t−i) = −
∑
j∈N\i
ηi←j 1
{
W ij ≥ 0
}
.
Note that the welfare-maximizing VCG mechanism does not guarantee that each bidder’s
net utility will be nonnegative, but rather no less than the utility if the bidder were to not
participate in the auction, which could be negative due to externalities.
Remark 4.1. While we choose the outside option to be the welfare-maximizing auction with
the remaining bidders, as is natural, we could instead have declared the ensuing auction
to have any feasible allocation rule for the bidders N\i that does not depend on bidder
i’s bid. For instance, a feasible outside option is to allocate all data to every j ∈ N\i if
bidder i does not participate, resulting in utility ui(∅, t−i; ti, t−i) = −
∑
j∈N\i ηi←j . This
is in fact the worst possible outside option for bidder i, which thereby increases the set of
IR-satisfying mechanisms. Indeed, as discussed in Section 5, this worst-case outside option is
the revenue-optimal one.
VCG Payment Rule. The payments associated with this allocation rule are for each
bidder i ∈ N , ∀t ∈ T ,
pi(t) =
∑
j∈N\i
W ijxj(ti = ∅, t−i)︸ ︷︷ ︸
SW when i is absent
−
∑
j∈N\i
Wjxj(t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
welfare of j 6= i
=
∑
j∈N\i
(
W ij (xj(ti = ∅, t−i)− xj(t)) + ηj←ixi(t)
)
=
∑
j∈N\i
(
W ij
[
1{W ij ≥ 0} − 1{Wj ≥ 0}
]
+ ηj←i 1{Wi ≥ 0}
)
(4.5)
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Note that bidder i’s payment is the sum of the change in welfare if she leaves the auction and
the sum of externalities she induces in the current allocation.
Proposition 4.2 (Efficient Mechanism, Scenario 1). The mechanism specified by allocation
function (4.3) with outside option (4.4) and payment function (4.5), maximizes social welfare
among all DSIC and ex-post IR auctions, and has no positive transfer.
A proof of these properties is given in Appendix B.1.
4.2 Welfare Maximization in Scenario 2
We now consider the case where bidders know the externality that they would exert on other
bidders if allocated the good, i.e. when the private type of each bidder i ∈ N , is ti = (vi,η←i).
Motivating Interim Constraints. Note that in this scenario, bidder i cannot fully eval-
uate her valuation of a given allocation x, since it depends on the parameters ηi←, which
are part of the private types of bidders j ∈ N\i. Therefore, each bidder can only reason
with her own realized type ti and the commonly known priors on other bidders’ types. It is
more sensible, therefore, to impose interim versions of truthfulness (BNIC) and participation
(interim IR) conditions (see Definitions 3.3 and 3.4 respectively).
Ex-Ante Welfare Optimality. As a first attempt toward a welfare-maximizing mechanism
in this setting, one may try to use the previous welfare-maximizing allocation rule (4.3). Due
to Proposition 3.7, however, this allocation violates BNIC when the private types are of the
form ti = (vi,η←i), since the corresponding interim allocation yi(ti) = 1{vi ≥
∑
j∈N\i ηj←i}
is not in general constant with respect to ηj←i.
In fact, any attempt to find such welfare-maximizing BNIC mechanisms will fail. It turns
out that in general, no mechanism satisfying BNIC can be ex-post (pointwise) welfare-maximal
over all types t, as stated next.
Proposition 4.3 (Impossibility of Ex-Post Optimality). Suppose bidders’ private types are
of the form ti = (vi,η←i) for each bidder i ∈ N . For any joint distribution F of types
t = (t1, . . . , tn), let
XBNIC(F ) := {x : T → [0, 1]n| ∀i ∈ N, yi(ti) = y˜i(vi) for some non-decreasing function y˜i}
be the set of allocation functions that satisfy condition (i) in the BNIC characterization. Then
there exists a distribution F of types on T s.t. ∀x ∈ XBNIC(F ), ∃t0 ∈ T and ∃x′ ∈ XBNIC(F )
s.t.
SW(x; t0) < SW(x′; t0) (4.6)
A proof of this proposition is provided in Appendix B.2.
Since Proposition 4.3 implies that there are distributions in which no mechanism satisfying
BNIC can also be welfare-maximizing over all type realizations, we relax the objective of
finding a pointwise optimum to one of maximizing the expected social welfare, that is,
E[SW(x; t)] =
∑
i∈N
E
[(
vi −
∑
j∈N\i
ηj←i
)
xi(t)
]
. (4.7)
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Proposition 4.4 (Welfare-Maximizing Allocation, Scenario 2). Suppose that the map vi 7→
vi −
∑
j∈N\i E[ηj←i|vi] is non-decreasing for every bidder i ∈ N . Then the allocation rule
maximizing the expected social welfare (4.7) under BNIC is
xi(t) = 1
{
vi ≥
∑
j∈N\i
E[ηj←i | vi]
}
, i ∈ N . (4.8)
Proof. To solve for the form of the expected welfare maximizing allocation function satisfying
the IC constraints, we first express the objective in terms of the interim allocations yi(ti).
Defining Wi(ti) := vi −
∑
j∈N\i ηj←i as in Section 4.1, we have
E
[
SW(x; t)
]
=
∑
i∈N
E[Wi(ti)xi(t)] =
∑
i∈N
E
[
E[Wi(ti)xi(ti, t−i) | ti]
]
=
∑
i∈N
E[Wi(ti)yi(ti)] .
Now, the BNIC characterization from Proposition 3.7 implies that there must exist functions y˜i :
[v
¯i
, v¯i]→ [0, 1] such that yi(ti) = y˜i(vi) for almost all ti ∈ Ti. Plugging in this representation
above, we get
E[SW(x; t)] =
∑
i∈N
E[Wi(ti)y˜i(vi)] =
∑
i∈N
E
[
y˜i(vi)E[Wi(ti) | vi]
]
.
Noting the linearity of the objective in y˜i, we find that the optimal allocation rule is
y˜i(vi) = 1
{
E[Wi(ti) | vi] ≥ 0
}
= 1
{
vi −
∑
j∈N\i
E[ηj←i | vi] ≥ 0
}
.
Under the given assumptions, y˜i(vi) is non-decreasing in vi, so BNIC is satisfied. Finally, note
that since we can express the objective function and constraints only in terms of the interim
allocations yi for i ∈ N , we can without loss of generality for all i ∈ N , set the allocation rule
xi(t) = yi(ti) = y˜i(vi).
Remark 4.5. Note that if we were selling a non-replicable good rather than the digital good of
our setting, the feasibility constraint
∑
i∈N xi ≤ 1 would couple the allocations and xi would
be a function of other bids vj for j 6= i.
Proposition 4.6 (Payment Rule Associated with Welfare-Maximizing Allocation, Scenario
2). Suppose that the map vi 7→ vi−
∑
j∈N\i E[ηj←i|vi] is non-decreasing for every bidder i ∈ N ,
and let τi := inf{v ∈ [v
¯ i
, v¯i] | v ≥
∑
j∈N\i E[ηj←i|v]}1. Consider the auction with the welfare-
maximizing allocation rule described in Proposition 4.4, that also runs the welfare-maximizing
allocation on the remaining set of bidders whenever some subset of bidders chooses not to
participate in the auction. Then the BNIC payment rule with this allocation is given by
pi(ti) =
∑
j∈N\i
τi · 1{vi ≥ τi} −
∑
j∈N\i
E
[
ηi←j · 1{vj ≥ τj}
]− Ci. (4.9)
Furthermore, IR is satisfied whenever Ci = Vi(ti; ti) ≥ Vi(∅; ti), for some ti of the form
(v
¯ i
,η←i) ∈ Ti. In particular, if the maps vj 7→ vj −
∑
k∈N\{j,i} E[ηk←j |vj ] are non-decreasing,
for j ∈ N\i, then Vi(∅; ti) is given by∑
j∈N\i
E
[
ηi←j · 1
{
vj ≥
∑
k∈N\{j,i}
E[ηk←j | vj ]
}]
(4.10)
1Here and throughout this paper, we use the convention that 0 · ∞ = 0
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Proof. The induced interim payment rule qi(ti) = E[pi(t) | ti] associated with yi as derived in
Proposition 3.7, condition (ii) is
qi(ti) = vi · yi(ti)−
∫ vi
v
¯i
y˜i(v)dv −
∑
j∈N\i
E
[
ηi←jxj(ti, t−i)
∣∣ ti]− Ci . (4.11)
Recall that the constant term Ci is set such that the payment function satisfies IR. By
Proposition 3.8, it suffices to check IR for any type of the form ti = (v
¯i
,η←i), for each i ∈ N .
Here, bidder i’s expected utility Vi(∅; ti) if she doesn’t participate is the sum of the externalities
effects from the allocations xj(ti = ∅, t−i) in the welfare-maximizing auction run with the
remaining set N\i of bidders, and given the assumption of vj 7→ vj −
∑
k∈N\{j,i} E[ηk←j |vj ]
non-decreasing, we have
Vi(∅; ti) =
∑
j∈N\i
E[ηi←jxj(ti = ∅, t−i)(t−i)] =
∑
j∈N\i
E
[
ηi←j 1
{
vj ≥
∑
k∈N\{j,i}
E[ηk←j |vj ]
}]
(4.12)
Then any payment rule of the form (4.11) with the constant Ci set greater than or equal to
Vi(∅; ti) in (4.12) will give us an IR mechanism.
Finally, since the objective function and constraints can be expressed solely in terms
of the interim payments qi, we can set pi(t) := qi(ti). Under the given assumption that
vi 7→ vi −
∑
j∈N\i E[ηj←i|vi] is non-decreasing, we can re-express the allocation rule as
xi(t) = yi(ti) = 1
{
vi ≥
∑
j∈N\i
E[ηj←i | vi]
}
(4.13)
= 1{vi ≥ τi} (4.14)
The integral term in (4.11) then becomes∫ vi
v
¯i
1{v ≥ τi}dv = (vi − τi) · 1{vi ≥ τi} = (vi − τi) · yi(ti)
Plugging in the above expression, along with the form of the allocation (4.13), into (4.11)
completes the proof.
Proposition 4.7 (Efficient Mechanism, Scenario 2). The mechanism specified by allocation
function (4.8), and that runs the welfare-maximizing auction with the remaining bidders
whenever a subset of bidders chooses not to participate, and uses payment function (4.9)
maximizes expected social welfare among all BNIC, interim IR auctions.
Proof. Immediate from Proposition 4.4 and 4.6.
5 Revenue Maximization
In this section, we focus on the problem of designing auctions that achieve optimal revenue.
Specifically, the goal is to design allocation and payment functions x(·) and p(·) to maximize
the seller’s expected revenue
Rev(x,p) :=
∑
i∈N
E
[
pi(t)
]
(5.1)
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subject to BNIC and interim IR constraints. Note that we can also express the expected
revenue as
∑
i∈N E
[
E[pi(t) | ti]
]
=
∑
i∈N E
[
qi(ti)
]
by the law of total expectation and the
definition of the interim payments.
5.1 Revenue Maximization in Scenario 1
We aim to maximize the seller’s expected revenue subject to BNIC and IR constraints,
where private types take the form ti = (vi,ηi←) for each i ∈ N . Recall the notation for
the interim allocation functions y(i)(t†i ) := E[x(ti, t−i)|ti] and the interim payment functions
qi(ti) := E[pi(ti, t−i)|ti], for each bidder i ∈ N . (See Section 3.2.1).
Independence assumption. For this section, we make the simplifying assumption that the
components of each bidder i’s type are independent, so the probability distribution function
of t†i factors as fi(t
†
i ) = Πk∈Nfi,k(t
†
i,k), where we define the density functions fi,k(t
†
i,k) =
fi,k(−ηi←k) := fηi←k(ηi←k) for i 6= k ∈ N and fi,i(t†i,i) = fvi(vi) for i ∈ N . We further define
the virtual value functions Φi,k(t
†
i,k) := t
†
i,k − (1− Fi,k(t†i,k))/fi,k(t†i,k).
Proposition 5.1. Suppose bidders have private types of the form ti = (vi,ηi←) for each bidder
i ∈ N , and that fi(t†i ) factorizes as fi(t†i ) = Πk∈Nfi,k(t†i,k). Suppose also that the distribution
F of bidder types is such that the virtual valuation functions Φi,k(t
†
i,k) are nondecreasing.
Then the mechanism with allocation rule
xi(t) = 1
{∑
k∈N
Φk,i(t
†
k,i) ≥ 0
}
, for t ∈ T (5.2)
xj(ti = ∅, t−i) = 1, for t−i ∈ T−i (5.3)
and payment functions given in Proposition 3.5 condition (iii) with Ci = −
∑
j∈N\i η
¯ j←i
is
revenue-optimal among BNIC and interim IR auctions.
The proof of Proposition 5.1 can be found in Appendix C.1. Note that the optimal outside
option to set is to allocate all data to all remaining bidders when bidder i does not participate.
Remark 5.2. We are able to prove this result despite the multidimensional nature of this
auction due to two assumptions. The first one exploits the fact data is inherently a digital,
freely replicable good and imposes no feasibility constraint on the allocation function besides
xi ∈ [0, 1], allowing us to effectively decouple the allocations. The second, more restrictive,
assumption is that the coordinates of t†i are independent. We do not know if it is necessary or
simply an artefact of our proof technique.
Remark 5.3. Observe that the allocation rule given in Proposition 5.1 is similar in form to the
threshold functions derived for the two social-welfare maximization cases (4.2) and (4.8) but
where the virtual value functions (as introduced in [Mye81]) now play the role of the relevant
coordinates of the bidders’ private types. As with standard revenue maximization settings,
the optimal allocation is in general not efficient, i.e. welfare-maximizing, and allocates the
digital good less often to bidders than the efficient allocation. An illustrative example is
described in Section 6.
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5.2 Revenue Maximization in Scenario 2
Recall in this case the private type of each bidder i ∈ N is ti = (vi,η←i). Using the BNIC
characterization of Proposition 3.7, Proposition 5.4 below shows that the problem of finding
the revenue-optimal mechanism can be reduced to solving n distinct optimizations over
single-variable functions. Throughout this section, we denote by Fvi (resp. fvi) the cumulative
(resp. probability) distribution function of the marginal distribution of vi, for i ∈ N .
Proposition 5.4 (Optimal Mechanism, Scenario 1). For each i ∈ N , let y?i be a solution to
the maximization problem
sup
y
E
[
y(vi)
(
vi − 1− Fvi(vi)
fvi(vi)
−
∑
j∈N\i
E[ηj←i | vi]
)]
,
where the maximization is over the set of non-decreasing functions y : [v
¯ i
, v¯i]→ [0, 1]. Then
the mechanism with allocation function xi(t) := y
?
i (vi), with payment function given by (3.2)
and setting Vi
(
v
¯ i
, (η
¯←i
)
)
= −∑j∈N\i E[ηi←j ], and with outside option defined as allocating
all information to all remaining bidders when bidder i does not participate is revenue optimal
among all BNIC and interim IR auctions.
The proof of Proposition 5.4 can be found in Appendix C.2.
Remark 5.5. In contrast to Proposition 5.1, Proposition 5.4 does not make the assumption of
independently coordinates for bidder i’s type. However, it again crucially exploits that data
is a freely replicable good.
As a corollary to Proposition 5.4, and similar to the single parameter setting [Mye81],
we obtain that under a certain regularity assumption, the optimal allocation rule takes a
simple form: set a threshold value for each bidder above which all information is allocated
and below which no information is allocated. In other words, the optimization problem of
Proposition 5.4 over single-variable functions further reduces to finding n parameters: the
optimal threshold value of each bidder.
Corollary 5.6 (Optimal Mechanism, Scenario 2). Define for i ∈ N , the virtual value function
Φi(vi) := vi− (1−Fvi(vi))/fvi(vi). Assume the function Φ˜i : vi 7→ Φi(vi)−
∑
j∈N\i E[ηj←i | vi]
is non-decreasing and define τi := Φ˜
−1
i (0). Then the mechanism given by
xi(t) = 1{vi ≥ τi} and pi(t) = 1{vi ≥ τi} · τi +
∑
j∈N\i
E
[
ηi←j 1{vj < τj}
]
, i ∈ N
is revenue optimal among all BNIC and interim IR mechanisms.
Proof. Observe that the optimization problem in the statement of Proposition 5.4 can be
written concisely in terms of Φ˜i(vi) as supy E[Φ˜i(vi)y(vi)] where the optimization is over non-
decreasing functions taking values in [0, 1]. Note that the pointwise optimal function y is given
by 1{Φ˜i(vi) ≥ 0} and that this function is non-decreasing in vi if Φ˜i is also non-decreasing.
The result then follows from Proposition 5.4.
Remark 5.7. Again, observe that Φ˜i is similar in form to the threshold functions derived for
the two social-welfare maximization cases (4.2) and (4.8). In contrast to Proposition 5.1, the
virtual function is only applied on the valuation vi.
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Example 5.8. If we further assume that (ηj←i) is independent of vi, then E[ηj←i | vi] = E[ηj←i]
and the last term in the definition of Φ˜i does not depend on vi. In this case our assumption
on Φ˜i is equivalent to the standard regularity assumption of the marginal distribution Fvi of
vi (see [Mye81]). The payments also take the simpler form
pi(vi) = 1{vi ≥ τi} · τi +
∑
j∈N\i
E[ηi←j ]P[vj < τj ] .
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we introduce a model for data auctions between n firms in the presence of
externalities. Our main modeling assumptions reduce the (a priori) combinatorial complexity
associated with data to the problem of designing auctions for a single, freely replicable good,
with linear utilities parameterized by n-dimensional types. Depending on what the private
type of the firms is, we are able to describe the revenue-maximizing and welfare-maximizing
auctions and find that in all cases, the optimal allocations is to either allocate all the data to
a firm if its value for data sufficiently outweighs the externalities it causes on other firms, or
allocate none of the data otherwise. The specific way in which this comparison is performed
depends on the situation considered and is summarized in Table 1.
xi(t) = 1{·} Scenario 1 (ηi←) Scenario 2 (η←i)
Welfare Maximization vi ≥
∑
j∈N\i ηj←i vi ≥
∑
j∈N\i E[ηj←i|vi]
Revenue Maximization Φi(vi) ≥
∑
j∈N\i−Φj,i(−ηj←i) Φi(vi) ≥
∑
j∈N\i E[ηj←i|vi]
Table 1: Summary of efficient and optimal allocation thresholds for the settings considered in
this paper.
We now provide some interpretation for Table 1. In Scenario 1, we go from welfare
maximization to revenue maximization by simply replacing the types (value for data and
externalities) with virtual types. This exactly mimics what happens in the standard result
[Mye81], where virtual values reduce the problem of maximizing revenue to maximizing welfare.
In Scenario 2, a similar reduction holds, but only the value for data needs to be transformed
via the virtual function. This can be intuitively explained as follows – in this scenario, the
externalities reported by a firm do not appear in the firm’s own utility but rather only affect
other firms’ utilities; hence, we find that the optimal allocations ignore these reports and
instead rely on the prior distribution on externalities.
For more intuition, we consider the special case of two bidders with uniformly distributed
type parameters in Scenario 1. The revenue-maximizing allocation allocates to bidders less
often than does the welfare-maximizing allocation and is in general not efficient. This is
illustrated in Figure 1, where the welfare-maximizing and revenue-maximizing allocations are
shown to partition the type space for t into the regions based on bidder 1’s allocation. For
details, see Appendix D.
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Figure 1: Partition of type space by welfare versus revenue maximizing allocations, assuming
v1 and η2←1 are uniformly distributed on their respective domains [0, 3] and [0, 2]. The shaded
regions denote where bidder 1 is allocated the entire dataset (x1 = 1) and the un-shaded
regions correspond to the opposite case of x1 = 0.
Note that these results are obtained under different assumptions. The social welfare case
in Scenario 1 is an instantiation of the VCG mechanism and requires no assumption beyond
our externality model. In Scenario 2, since firms do not know the externality other firms
cause on them, they have to reason in expectation about their utility and hence this scenario
requires a common known prior on the type distribution.
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A IC and IR Characterizations
A.1 Proof of Proposition 3.6
Proof. We first show that the optimal outside option when bidder i does not participate
allocates the digital good to all remaining participants N\i. We then show that it suffices
to check that interim IR is satisfied for the type t˚i, and finally find the optimal value of the
integration constant Vi(˚ti; t˚i).
Optimal Outside Option. The interim IR constraint is essentially a constraint on the
values that the constant Ci = Vi(˚ti; t˚i) can take. That is, after plugging in the form of the
payment rule (3.1), interim IR can be expressed as: ∀i ∈ N, ∀ti ∈ Ti,
Vi(˚ti; t˚i) +
∫ t†i
t˚†i
y(i)(s†i ) · ds†i ≥ Vi(∅; ti).
Maximizing revenue corresponds to maximizing the expected sum of the interim payments
qi(ti) and thus of minimizing Vi(˚ti; t˚i). Since ∀ti, Vi(∅; ti) ≥ −
∑
j∈N\i−ηi←j , we can maximize
the feasible region for IR payments by setting Vi(∅; ti) = −
∑
j∈N\i−ηi←j with an outside
option that allocates to all j ∈ N\i when i does not participate. That is, we set xj(tˆi =
∅, tˆ−i) = 1{i 6= j} for all i, j ∈ N and t−i ∈ T−i.
Sufficiency of Checking interim IR for type t˚i If the interim IR constraint holds for
all types ti, then it clearly holds for the type t˚i. Now suppose that Vi(˚ti; t˚i) ≥ Vi(∅; t˚i). Note
that given the optimal outside option of allocating to all remaining bidders, we have that for
every ti ∈ Ti,
Vi(∅; ti) = −
∑
j∈N\i
ηi←j . (A.1)
Then for every ti ∈ Ti
Vi(ti; ti) = Vi(˚ti; t˚i) +
∫ t†i
t˚†i
yi(s†i ) · ds†i
≥ Vi(˚ti; t˚i) +
∑
j∈N\i
(−ηi←j − (−η
¯i←j
))
= Vi(˚ti; t˚i) + Vi(∅; ti)− Vi(∅; t˚i)
≥ Vi(∅; ti)
where for the first inequality we used that t†i,i = vi ≥ v¯i, t
†
i,j = −ηi←j ≤ −η
¯i←j
and yi ≥ 0 as
an allocation vector, the second equality follows from (A.1), and the last inequality follows
from our assumption that Vi(˚ti; t˚i)− Vi(∅; t˚i) ≥ 0.
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A.2 Proof of Proposition 3.7
Proof. We first show the necessary implications of IC. Writing Definition 3.3 for ti = (vi,η←i)
as the true type and tˆi = (vˆi, ηˆi→) as the reported type, and then vise versa, i.e.
Vi(ti; ti) ≥ Vi(tˆi; ti) (A.2)
Vi(tˆi; tˆi) ≥ Vi(ti; tˆi).
Combining the two inequalities yields
yi(ti)(vi − vˆi) ≥ yi(tˆi)(vi − vˆi).
By Lemma A.1 below, this implies condition (1).
Note also that the inequality (A.2), by adding and subtracting the term vˆiyi(tˆi) to the
right hand side and regrouping terms, can be written equivalently as
∀ti, tˆi ∈ Ti,
Vi(ti; ti) ≥ Vi(tˆi) + (vi − vˆi)xi(vˆi). (A.3)
Then plugging in ti = (vi,η←i) and tˆi = (vi, ηˆi→) into the preceding inequality yields
Vi(ti; ti) ≥ Vi(tˆi). Swapping the roles of ti and tˆi yields the inequality in the opposite direction,
and we have that Vi(ti; ti) is independent of η←i:
∀vi, ∀η←i,∀ηˆi→, Vi(vi,η←i)) = Vi(vi, ηˆi→)).
We henceforth write V˜i(vi) to denote Vi(vi,η←i) for any η←i, and likewise let y˜i(vi) :=
yi(vi,η←i).
To prove (3), we first note that Vi(ti; ti) is convex in vi. (A.2) implies that
Vi(ti; ti) = max
tˆi∈Ti
yi(tˆi)vi −
∑
j∈N\i
E
[
ηi←j · xj(tˆi, t−i)
∣∣ ti]− qi(tˆi).
Thus, Vi(ti; ti) is the maximum of a family of linear functions of vi and is thus convex in vi.
(A.3) implies that yi(ti) is a subderivative of Vi(vi). In fact, since Vi is convex in vi, it is
differentiable almost everywhere and
y˜i(vi) =
∂Vi(ti; ti)
∂vi
a.e.
Further, this implies that
Vi(vi,η←i) =
∫ vi
v
¯i
y˜i(v)dv + V˜i(v
¯i
) (A.4)
where for the last term we used the fact that Vi((v
¯i
,η←i); (v¯i
,η←i)) = Vi(v¯i
,η
¯i→
). Now
plugging in the following expression for Vi,
Vi(tˆi; ti) = vi · yi(tˆi)−
∑
j∈N\i
E
[
ηi←j · xj(tˆi, t−i)
∣∣ ti]− qi(tˆi) .
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and solving for qi(ti), we get
qi(ti) = viy˜i(vi)−
∫ vi
v
¯i
y˜i(v)dv −
∑
j∈N\i
E[ηi←j · xj(ti, t−i) | ti]− V˜i(v
¯i
). (A.5)
We next show the sufficiency of conditions 1-3. for IC, by proving the equivalent condition
for IC, (A.3). We have that ∀i ∈ N, ∀ti = (vi,η←i), ∀tˆi = (vˆi, ηˆi→),
Vi(ti; ti)− Vi(tˆi) =
∫ vi
vˆi
y˜i(v)dv
≥ y˜i(vˆi)(vi − vˆi)
where the first equality follows from (A.4) and the inequality follows from condition 1 that
y˜i(vi) is increasing in vi.
Lemma A.1. For d ≥ 1, let f : R× Rd → R be a bounded function such that
f(x2, y2)(x2 − x1) ≥ f(x1, y1)(x2 − x1), (x1, y1), (x2, y2) ∈ R× Rd .
Then, there exists a non-decreasing function f˜ : R→ R such that f(x, y) = f˜(x) for all y ∈ Rd
and for all but at most countably many values of x ∈ R.
Proof. By a rescaling and shifting of f we assume without loss of generality that the range of
f is contained in [0, 1]. Let us now define S := {x ∈ R : ∃y1, y2 ∈ Rd s.t. f(x, y2) 6= f(x, y1)}
and for n ≥ 1, Sn := {x ∈ R : ∃y1, y2 ∈ Rd s.t. f(x, y2) − f(x, y1) ≥ 1/n} and observe that
S = ∪n≥1Sn.
We now prove that |Sn| ≤ n. Indeed, consider x1 < · · · < xm, m distinct points in Sn,
and for each k ∈ [m], y1k, y2k such that f(xk, y2k)− f(xk, y1k) ≥ 1/n. Then
m
n
≤
m∑
k=1
[
f(xk, y
2
k)− f(xk, y1k)
]
= f(xm, y
2
m)−
m∑
k=2
[f(xk, y
1
k)− f(xk−1, y2k−1)]− f(x1, y11)
≤ f(xm, y2m)− f(x1, y11) ≤ 1 ,
where the first inequality uses the definition of Sn, the equality is summation by parts, the
second inequality uses our assumption on f and the last inequality uses that the range of f is
contained in [0, 1]. It then follows that m ≤ n, i.e. that |Sn| ≤ n, which in turn implies that
S is countable.
Define f˜ by f˜(x) = f(x, y) for x /∈ S (this definition does not depend on the choice of y by
definition of S). Then our assumption on f immediately implies that f˜ is non-decreasing on
R\S. We can thus extend f˜ to a non-decreasing function defined over all of R (for example
by right continuity). The resulting f˜ satisfies the stated requirements.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 3.8
Proof. Note that BNIC implies (A.4), and since y˜i ≥ 0, we have that Vi(ti; ti) ≥ V˜i(v
¯i
) for all
ti ∈ Ti. Since Vi(∅; ti) is independent with respect to ti, it is both necessary and sufficient for
IR to hold that the IR condition holds for some type of the form (v
¯i
,η←i), for each bidder
i ∈ N .
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B Welfare Maximization
B.1 Proof of Proposition 4.2
Proof. We show that the specified VCG mechanism (1) satisfies DSIC, (2) ex-post IR, and
(3) uses nonnegative payments.
1. ∀i ∈ N, ∀ti, tˆi ∈ Ti, t−i, tˆ−i ∈ T−i, let us temporarily define the following quantities for
ease of notation. Note the only quantity varying in the following terms is bidder i’s bid,
while all other parameters are fixed.
xi := xi(ti, tˆi), xˆi := xi(tˆi, tˆi)
xj := xj(ti, tˆi), xˆj := xj(tˆi, tˆi), x
i
j := xj(ti = ∅, t−i), for j ∈ N\i
pi := pi(ti, tˆi), pˆi := xi(tˆi, tˆi)
Wi := vi −
∑
j∈N\i
ηj←i, Wˆi := vˆi −
∑
j∈N\i
ηj←i
Wj = vj −
∑
k∈N\j
ηk←j , Wˆj := vj −
∑
k∈N\{j,i}
ηk←j − ηˆi←j , for j ∈ N\i
We show that the following expression is nonnegative, which is precisely the statement
of DSIC:
ui
(
x(ti, tˆ−i), pi(ti, tˆ−i); t
)− ui(x(tˆ), pi(tˆ); t)
= (xi − xˆi)vi −
∑
j∈N\i
ηi←j(xj − xˆj) +
∑
j∈N\i
(−W ij (xij − xj)− ηj←ixi +W ij (xij − xˆj)− ηj←ixˆi)
= (xi − xˆi)(vi −
∑
j∈N\i
ηj←i) +
∑
j∈N\i
(W ij − ηi←j)(xj − xˆj)
= (1(Wi ≥ 0)− 1(Wˆi ≥ 0))Wi +
∑
j∈N\i
Wj(1(Wj ≥ 0)− 1(Wˆj ≥ 0))
≥ 0.
For the first equality we used the second expression of the payment rule in (4.5), we
regrouped terms and used the definitions of Wi,Wj for the second and third equalities.
The final inequality holds because
1(Wi ≥ 0)− 1(Wˆi ≥ 0) =

1 iff Wi ≥ 0 and Wˆi < 0
−1 iff Wi < 0 and Wˆi ≥ 0
0 else.
and likewise for 1(Wj ≥ 0)− 1(Wˆj ≥ 0), implies that each term in the summation is
nonnegative.
2. Let t be an arbitrary type realization. Showing ex-post IR is equivalent to showing
vixi −
∑
j∈N\i
ηi←jxj − pi ≥ ui(x(∅, t−i), pi(∅, t−i); t) = −
∑
j∈N\i
ηi←jxij .
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Plugging in the payment rule, we get the equivalent inequality
vixi −
∑
j∈N\i
(
W ij (x
i
j − xj) + ηj←ixi
) ≥ − ∑
j∈N\i
ηi←j(xij − xj)
Rearranging and regrouping terms, we get that this is equivalent to
Wixi −
∑
j∈N\i
Wj(x
i
j − xj) ≥ 0
Since xi = 1(Wi ≥ 0), the first term is always nonnegative. The terms in the summation
are likewise nonnegative since
xij − xj =

1 iff Wj ≥ 0 and W ij < 0
−1 iff Wj < 0 and W ij ≥ 0
0 else.
Thus, the IR constraint is satisfied for all types t.
3. Let t be an arbitrary type realization. Note that since ηj←i ≥ 0, we can bound the
payments given by (4.5) by
pi ≥
∑
j∈N\i
W ij (1(W
i
j ≥ 0)− 1(Wj ≥ 0))
We have that
1(W ij ≥ 0)− 1(Wj ≥ 0) =

1 iff W ij ≥ 0 and Wj < 0
−1 iff W ij < 0 and Wj ≥ 0
0 else
Matching up the cases, we get that pi ≥ 0, so payments are nonnegative.
B.2 Proof of Proposition 4.3
Proof. Consider the distribution of types F with probability mass 1/2 on each of two points:
ta = (vˆ1,η
a
1→, tˆ−1) and tb = (vˆ1,ηb1→, tˆ−1), where vˆ1 ∈ R ≥ 0 and tˆ−1 = (tj : j 6= 1) take
arbitrary, fixed values. Let ηa1→ = (ηj←1 : j 6= 1) and ηa1→ = (ηj←1 : j 6= 1) be such that
vˆ1 −
∑
j∈N\1
ηaj←1 > 0 (B.1)
and vˆ1 −
∑
j∈N\1
ηbj←1 < 0 (B.2)
For instance, we can take ηa1→ = 0 and ηb1→ = 2vˆ11.
Note that ∀x(·) ∈ XBNIC(F ), ∀t ∈ T , x1(t) = E[x1(t)|t1] = y˜i(vi) for some increasing
function y˜i(vi). However, under distribution F , vi only takes the single value vˆi, so the
function x1(t) must be constant-valued.
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Then ∀x(·) ∈ XBNIC(F ), ∀t ∈ T , if x1(t) > 0, let y(·) be such that y1(t) = 0 and
yj(t) = xj(t) for all j 6= 1. We have that
SW (x; tb)− SW (y; tb)
=(vˆ1 −
∑
j∈N\i
ηbj←1)(x1(t
b)− y1(tb)) < 0
where the strict inequality follows from (B.2) and that ∀t, x1(t) > 0 = y1(t). Likewise, if
x1(t) ≤ 0, let y(·) be such that y1(t) = 1 and yj(t) = xj(t) for all j 6= 1. Then
SW (x; ta)− SW (y; ta)
=(vˆ1 −
∑
j∈N\1
ηaj←1)(x1(t
a)− y1(ta)) < 0
where the strict inequality follows from (B.1) and that ∀t, x1(t) ≤ 0 < 1 = y1(t).
Thus, we have shown that for any allocation rule in a BNIC mechanism, there is some type
realization such that a different BNIC allocation rule yields a strictly greater social welfare,
which is the statement in (4.6).
C Revenue Maximization
C.1 Proof of Proposition 5.1
Proof.
Deriving the Optimal Allocation. We first use the form of the interim payment functions
from the BNIC characterization in Proposition 3.5 to express our objective solely in terms of
interim allocation functions.
E[
∑
i∈N
pi(~t)] =
∑
i∈N
E[E[pi(~t)|t†i ]] =
∑
i∈N
E[qi(t†i )]
=
∑
i∈N
E[y(i)(t†i ) · t†i −
∫ t†i
t˚†i
y(i)(s†i ) · ds†i − Ci]
=
∑
i∈N
E[y(i)(t†i ) · t†i −
∫ t†i
t
¯
†
i
y(i)(s†i ) · ds†i − C ′i]
In the last equality, we shifted the lower bound of integration from t˚†i to t¯
†
i := v¯i
ei −∑
j∈N\i η¯i←jej along with the corresponding constant of integration Ci to C
′
i. Accordingly,
we let t
¯i
denote the type (v
¯i
, (η¯i←j)j 6=i), which can be considered the “lowest” type of bidder
i, as it yields the lowest valuation on any given allocation over all feasible types. Originally
Ci = V (˚ti; t˚i), and now the new constant of integration C
′
i sets the value of V (t¯i
; t
¯i
). The
constant term C ′i can be set independently of the allocation functions, and we defer finding
the optimal such C ′i (and thus Ci) satisfying IR to the last part of this proof, after we have
solved for the optimal allocation rules.
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Expanding the inner product in the first term above and ignoring the constant C ′i, we
temporarily take our objective to be
E
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈N
y
(i)
j (t
†
i )t
†
i,j
− ∫ t†i
t
¯
†
i
y(i)(s†i ) · ds†i
 (C.1)
Fix any k ∈ N . We now re-express the above integral term to be linear in y(i)k (t†i ). By
Proposition 3.5, y(i) is a conservative vector field, so we can evaluate the line integral by
taking any path from t
¯
†
i = (t¯
†
i,1, ..., t¯
†
i,n) to t
†
i = (t
†
i,1, ..., t
†
i,n). Let us take any path that first
fixes the kth coordinate while moving all other coordinates to their final value at the point
(t†i,1, ..., t
†
i,k−1, t¯
†
i,k, t
†
i,k+1, ..., t
†
i,n) and then from there moves parallel to the kth coordinate axis
to the endpoint t†i . That is, we evaluate the line integral as∫ t†i
t
¯
†
i
y(i)(s†i ) · ds†i =
∫ (t†i,1,...,t†i,k−1,t¯†i,k,t†i,k+1,...,t†i,n)
(t
¯
†
i,1,...,t¯
†
i,n)
y(i)(s†i,1, ..., s
†
i,k−1, t¯
†
i,k, s
†
i,k+1, ..., s
†
i,n) · ds†i
+
∫ t†i,k
t
¯
†
i,k
y
(i)
k (t
†
i,1, ..., t
†
i,k−1, s
†
i,k, t
†
i,k+1, ..., t
†
i,n)ds
†
i,k
(C.2)
Note that the first integral term on the right hand side of (C.2) does not depend on the
value of t†i,k. To emphasize this fact, we temporarily denote this quantity by
ξk(t
†
i,1, ..., t
†
i,k−1, t
†
i,k+1, ..., t
†
i,n) :=
∫ (t†i,1,...,t†i,k−1,t¯†i,k,t†i,k+1,...,t†i,n)
(t
¯
†
i,1,...,t¯
†
i,n)
y(i)(s†i,1, ..., s
†
i,k−1, t¯
†
i,k, s
†
i,k+1, ..., s
†
i,n) · ds†i .
(C.3)
Next, we use the assumption of independence of the components of t†i to evaluate the
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expectation of the second term on the right hand side of (C.2):
E

∫ t†i,k
t
¯
†
i,k
y
(i)
k (t
†
i,1, ..., t
†
i,k−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
t†i,k−
, s†i,k, t
†
i,k+1, ..., t
†
i,n)︸ ︷︷ ︸
t†i,k+
ds†i,k

=
 ∏
j∈N\k
∫ t¯†i,j
t
¯
†
i,j
dt†i,jfi,j(t
†
i,j)
∫ t¯†i,k
t
¯
†
i,k
dt†i,kfi,k(t
†
i,k)
∫ t†i,k
t
¯
†
i,k
ds†i,ky
(i)
k (t
†
i,k−, s
†
i,k, t
†
i,k+)
=
 ∏
j∈N\k
∫ t¯†i,j
t
¯
†
i,j
dt†i,jfi,j(t
†
i,j)
∫ t¯†i,k
t
¯
†
i,k
ds†i,ky
(i)
k (t
†
i,k−, s
†
i,k, t
†
i,k+)
∫ t¯ik
s†i,k
dt†i,kfi,k(t
†
i,k)
=
 ∏
j∈N\k
∫ t¯†i,j
t
¯
†
i,j
dt†i,jfi,j(t
†
i,j)
∫ t¯†i,k
t
¯
†
i,k
ds†i,kfi,k(s
†
i,k)y
(i)
k (t
†
i,k−, s
†
i,k, t
†
i,k+)
1− Fi,k(s†i,k)
fi,k(s
†
i,k)
=E
[
y
(i)
k (t
†
i,1, ..., t
†
i,k−1, t
†
i,k, t
†
i,k+1, ..., t
†
i,n)
1− Fi,k(t†i,k)
fi,k(t
†
i,k)
]
=E
[
y
(i)
k (t
†
i )
1− Fi,k(t†i,k)
fi,k(t
†
i,k)
]
The first equality follows by definition of expectation and by the independence of the coor-
dinates of t†i , the second by changing the order of integration, the third by definition of the
CDF, and the fourth by the definition of expectation once again.
Plugging the last expression and (C.3) back into the objective (C.1), we get
E
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈N
y
(i)
j (t
†
i )t
†
i,j
−(ξk(t†i,1, ..., t†i,k−1, t†i,k+1, ..., t†i,n) + y(i)k (t†i )1− Fi,k(t†i,k)
fi,k(t
†
i,k)
)
=E
∑
i∈N
y
(i)
k (t
†
i )(t
†
i,k −
1− Fi,k(t†i,k)
fi,k(t
†
i,k)
) +
∑
i∈N
 ∑
j∈N\k
y
(i)
j (t
†
i )t
†
i,j − ξk(t†i,1, ..., t†i,k−1, t†i,k+1, ..., t†i,n)

=E
∑
i∈N
E
[
xk(t)(t
†
i,k −
1− Fi,k(t†i,k)
fi,k(t
†
i,k)
)
∣∣∣∣∣ti
]
+
∑
i∈N
 ∑
j∈N\k
y
(i)
j (t
†
i )t
†
i,j − ξk(t†i,1, ..., t†i,k−1, t†i,k+1, ..., t†i,n)

=E
[
xk(t)
∑
i∈N
(
t†i,k −
1− Fi,k(t†i,k)
fi,k(t
†
i,k)
)]
+ E
∑
i∈N
 ∑
j∈N\k
y
(i)
j (t
†
i )t
†
i,j − ξk(t†i,1, ..., t†i,k−1, t†i,k+1, ..., t†i,n)

where we rearrange terms to arrive at the first equality, use the definition of interim allocation
for the second, and the law of total expectation and linearity of expectation for the last
equality. Note that neither the allocation function xk nor any of the interim allocations y
(i)
k
to bidder k, for i ∈ N , feature in the second expectation term. There are also no coupling
constraints between the allocations xk and xj for j 6= k. Since we have expressed the objective
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as linear in xk(t), the optimal allocation rule xk(t) can thus be read off as
xk(t) = 1
{∑
i∈N
(
t†i,k −
1− Fi,k(t†i,k)
fi,k(t
†
i,k)
)
≥ 0
}
(C.4)
= 1
Φk,k(vk) + ∑
i∈N\k
Φi,k(−ηi←k) ≥ 0

= 1
vk − 1− Fk,k(vk)fk,k(vk) + ∑
i∈N\k
(
−ηi←k − Fηi←k(ηi←k)
fηi←k(ηi←k)
)
≥ 0

where Φi,k(t
†
i,k) = t
†
i,k−
1−Fi,k(t†i,k)
fi,k(t
†
i,k)
is the virtual valuation of the parameter t†i,k for i, k ∈ N , and
we used the fact that fi,k(t
†
i,k) := fηi←k(ηi←k) and correspondingly, Fi,k(t
†
i,k) = 1−Fηi←k(ηi←k).
Since k was fixed arbitrarily, the form of the optimal allocation rule (C.4) holds for all k ∈ N .
Verifying BNIC. We first show that the interim allocation vector fields y(i) are monotone.
Note that for k ∈ N , the allocation functions xk(t) are only dependent on t†i,k, for all i ∈ N .
Further, y
(i)
k (t
†
i ) = P[
∑
j∈N (t
†
j,k −
1−Fj,k(t†j,k)
fj,k(t
j
k)
) ≥ 0|t†i,k] is increasing in t†i,k since Φi,k(t†i,k) is
increasing in t†i,k, and y
(i)
k (t
†
i ) only depends on the parameter t
†
i,k. Given this, let y˜
i
k be a
single-parameter, increasing function such that y
(i)
k (t
†
i ) = y˜
i
k(t
†
i,k). Then ∀s†i , t†i ∈ Ti,
(s†i − t†i ) · (y(i)(s†i )− y(i)(t†i ))
=
∑
k∈N
(s†i,k − t†i,k)(y˜ik(s†i,k)− y˜ik(t†i,k)) ≥ 0.
The inequality holds because each term in the sum is nonnegative, since y˜ik are increasing
functions.
Next, note that the functions y˜ik are integrable, and let Y
(i)(t†i ) =
∑n
k=1
∫ t†i,k
t
¯
†
i,k
y˜ik(s
†
i,k)ds
†
i,k.
It can be checked that y(i) is the gradient of potential function Y (i). Thus, the vector fields
y(i) are conservative.
IR and the Optimal Payment. Finally, we consider the interim IR constraint and the
optimal constant term of the payment function. By Proposition 3.6, the optimal outside
option is to allocate xj = 1 to all bidders j ∈ N\i when bidder i does not participate and it
suffices to check interim IR for the type t˚i = (v
¯i
,η
¯i←
). That is, interim IR given the optimal
outside option is equivalent to having
Ci = Vi(˚ti; t˚i) ≥ Vi(∅; t˚i) = −
∑
j∈N\i
η
¯i←j
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Maximizing revenue corresponds to maximizing the expected sum of the interim payments
qi(ti) and thus of minimizing Vi(˚ti; t˚i). Hence, in the revenue-maximizing auction, we set the
constant Ci in the payment function to be −
∑
j∈N\i η
¯i←j
. Recall that we re-expressed our
objective function in terms of the constant C ′i = Vi(t¯i
; t
¯i
), which is fully determined by the
interim allocation rule y(i) given above and Ci. Thus the corresponding optimal constant C
′
i
that yields an IR mechanism is
C ′i =
∫ t˚†i
t
¯
†
i
y(i)(s†i ) · ds†i + Ci =
∫ t˚†i
t
¯
†
i
y(i)(s†i ) · ds†i −
∑
j∈N\i
η
¯i←j
.
By construction, our payment rule satisfies the BNIC characterization of Proposition 3.5,
so our overall mechanism is BNIC and interim IR.
C.2 Proof of Proposition 5.4
Proof. We consider a mechanism (x, p) and use the BNIC characterization of Proposition 3.7.
In particular, recall that there exists a non-decreasing function y˜i such that yi(t) = y˜i(vi),
where yi is the interim allocation. Plugging in the form of interim payments qi given by (3.2)
we get
Rev(x,p) =
∑
i∈N
E
viy˜i(vi)− ∫ vi
v
¯i
y˜i(v)dv −
∑
j∈N\i
E [ηi←j · xj(t) | ti]− Vi
(
v
¯i
, (η
¯j←i
)
) .
(C.5)
Observe that the last term on the right-hand side is independent of the choice of (x,p) and
can thus be ignored when searching for the revenue optimal auction.
For the second term, swapping the order of integration gives
E
[∫ vi
v
¯i
y˜i(v)dv
]
=
∫ v¯i
v
¯i
fvi(vi)
(∫ vi
v
¯i
y˜i(v)dv
)
dvi
=
∫ v¯i
v
¯i
(
1− Fvi(vi)
)
y˜i(vi)dvi = E
[
1− Fvi(vi)
fvi(vi)
· y˜i(vi)
]
.
For the third term, we write
E
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈N\i
E [ηi←jxj(t) | ti]
 = ∑
i∈N
∑
j∈N\i
E
[
ηi←j · xj(t)
]
=
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈N\i
E
[
ηj←i · xi(t)
]
=
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈N\i
E
[
ηj←i · E[xi(t) | ti]
]
=
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈N\i
E
[
ηj←i · y˜i(vi)
]
=
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈N\i
E
[
y˜i(vi) · E[ηj←i | vi]
]
,
where the first, third and last equality use the law of total expectation, the second equality is
just a change of index and the penultimate is by definition of y˜i.
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Combining the previous derivations, we get that the revenue maximizing problem is
equivalent to maximizing
∑
i∈N
E
y˜i(vi)
vi − 1− Fvi(vi)
fvi(vi)
−
∑
j∈N\i
E[ηj←i | vi]
 . (C.6)
where y˜i is the interim allocation computed from xi and must be non-decreasing by Proposition
3.7. Hence, we see that the objective function as well as the BNIC and IR constraints can be
written solely in terms of the functions (y˜i)i∈N . It is thus sufficient to optimize over them
separately, under the constraint that y˜i be non-decreasing and [0, 1]-valued. Given an optimal
choice of (y?i )i∈N , we can then define xi and pi as in the proposition statement.
To complete the proof we need to choose the smallest Vi((v
¯i
,η
¯←i
); (v
¯i
,η
¯←i
)) in (C.5)
such that interim IR is satisfied. By Proposition 3.8, it suffices to set Vi((v
¯i
,η
¯←i
); (v
¯i
,η
¯←i
))
to be the lowest interim utility a bidder could get in any outside option, which is exactly
−∑j∈N\i E[ηj←i].
D Welfare versus Revenue Maximization in Scenario 1
As stated in section 5.1, given a distribution function Fi←j and corresponding density function
fi←j for ηi←j on [η
¯i←j
, η¯i←j ], for i 6= j ∈ N , we define the distribution of t†i,j on [−η¯i←j ,−η
¯i←j
]
by the distribution and density functions
Fi,j(t
†
i,j) = 1− Fηi←j (−t†i,j) = 1− Fηi←j (ηi←j)
fi,j(t
†
i,j) = fηi←j (−t†i,j) = fηi←j (ηi←j).
Further, ∀i, j ∈ N , we define the virtual value functions Φi,j(t†i,j) := t†i,j−(1−Fi,j(t†i,j))/fi,j(t†i,j).
Then ∀i ∈ N and j ∈ N\i, we can express the virtual functions as
Φi,i(t
†
i,i) = vi − (1− Fvi(vi))/fvi(vi)
Φi,j(t
†
i,j) = −ηi←j − Fηi←j (ηi←j)/fηi←j (ηi←j)
Suppose all vi, ηi←j for i ∈ N, j ∈ N\i are uniformly distributed on their respective
domains. The virtual value functions take the forms
Φi,i(t
†
i,i) = 2vi − v¯i
Φi,j(t
†
i,j) = −2ηi←j + η
¯i←j
The optimal allocation rule 5.2 then becomes
xk(t) = 1(
∑
i∈N
φi,k(t
†
i,k) ≥ 0)
= 1((2vk − v¯k) +
∑
i∈N\k
(−2ηi←k + η
¯i←k
) ≥ 0)
= 1(vk −
∑
i∈N\k
ηi←k ≥
v¯k −
∑
i∈N\k η
¯i←k
2
)
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In the case of n = 2 bidders, bidder 1’s allocation is
x1(t) = 1(v1 − η2←1 ≥
v¯1 − η
¯2←1
2
)
Meanwhile, the welfare-maximizing allocation rule for bidder 1 is
x1(t) = 1(v1 − η2←1 ≥ 0).
Thus, the revenue-maximizing allocation allocates to bidders less often than does the welfare-
maximizing allocation. The optimal mechanism therefore is not in general efficient. This is
illustrated in Figure 1, where the welfare-maximizing and revenue-maximizing allocations are
shown to partition the type space for t into the regions based on bidder 1’s allocation.
E Learning
A natural concern with the optimal mechanisms described in Section 5 is that they rely on
the knowledge of the type distribution. For example, even in the regular case of Corollary 5.6,
the threshold value τi of bidder i is described as the zero of the virtual value function which
itself depends heavily on the distribution of the type of bidder i. In this section, we explore a
situation where the type distribution is initially unknown by the mechanism designer and
learned over time.
E.1 Problem description
We consider a sequential learning setting in which at each time step, the seller attempts to
sell a digital good in an auction with n buyers whose types are drawn from an unknown
distribution. The task of the seller is to design an auction mechanism to both satisfy the
BNIC and IR constraints at each time step, and also learn the unknown distribution over
time and converge to the optimal auction. Specifically, at time step k ≥ 1:
1. the data seller announces the BNIC and IR mechanism µk =
(
xk(·),pk(·)) which will
be used for this time step;
2. a vector of types tk ∈ T is drawn from the distribution f independently of previous
time steps;
3. the good is allocated according to x(t) and the seller collects the payments p(t).
We emphasize that the underlying distribution f from which the types are drawn is
unknown to the seller and so µk cannot depend directly on it. However, the seller observes the
types reported in previous time steps and can use these observations to inform the design of
xk(·) and pk(·). A natural benchmark to evaluate the performance of the chosen sequence of
mechanisms is to compare its cumulative revenue to the one which would have been obtained
using the optimal auction. Formally, let x?(·) and p?(·) denote the revenue-optimal BNIC and
IR auction—which depends on the distribution f—and define the regret up to time step K by
R(K) =
K∑
k=1
[
Rev(x?,p?)− Rev(xk,pk)] , K ≥ 1 .
The goal of the data seller is thus to design a sequence of mechanisms which incurs as
small a regret as possible.
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Remark E.1. An important assumption in this sequential learning setting is that the buyers’
types are redrawn at each time step from the same distribution and that buyers only strategize
within each time step (hence the BNIC and IR constraints) but not across times steps.
As such, we ignore intertemporal incentive issues, which could for example lead buyers to
misreport their types in order to bias the learning of the distribution that the seller performs
over time. We note that an alternative learning model would consider a single-shot auction in
which buyers’ types are drawn from identical distributions. In this case, one can still hope to
learn the type distribution in a single time step as the number of buyers n goes to infinity.
The problem of buyers misreporting their types can be addressed by learning the unknown
distribution from a subsample S ⊂ N of the buyers and then using the learned mechanism
only on the remaining N\S buyers. This approach was for example adopted in [GHK+06].
E.2 A stochastic optimization solution
We now provide a solution to the sequential learning problem of Section E.1 which leverages
the specific structure of the optimal mechanism described in Section 5.2. We will make the
following two simplifying assumptions:
• for each buyer i, the distribution of her value vi is independent from the distribution
of externalities η←i she causes on others. Furthermore, for all i and j ∈ N\i, the
expectation E[ηi←j ] is known to the seller;
• for each buyer i, the function vi 7→ vigi(vi) − (1 − Gi(vi)) − gi(vi)
∑
j∈N\i E[ηj←i] is
non-decreasing.
Under these assumptions, Corollary 5.6 combined with Example 5.8 imply that the revenue-
optimal BNIC and IR mechanism is given by
x?i (t) = 1{vi ≥ τ?i } and p?i (t) = 1{vi ≥ τ?i } · τ?i +
∑
j∈N\i
E[ηi←j ] ·Gj(τ?j ) ,
where the vector τ ? of optimal thresholds is described in Corollary 5.6. A simple computation
further implies that
H(τ ?) := Rev(x?,p?) =
∑
i∈N
τ?i −Gi(τi)(τ?i − ∑
j∈N\i
E[ηj←i]
) . (E.1)
This formula has a number of important consequences. First, observe that the mechanism
obtained by replacing τ ? by any other vector of thresholds τ is also BNIC and IR. Since the
optimal mechanism is given by the choice of τ ?, optimizing the function H over the choice of
τ ∈∏i∈N [v¯i, v¯i] is sufficient to obtain the optimal mechanism. In other words, the problem of
finding the optimal mechanism reduces to the optimization of the function H. Furthermore,
note that this maximization problem is separable: denoting by Hi the summand in (E.1) we
have that H(τ ) =
∑
i∈N Hi(τi) and hence, the problem reduces to separately maximizing
each function Hi over the choice of a single-dimension parameter τi. Finally, observe that the
derivative of Hi is hi(τi) := 1−τigi(τi)−Gi(τi)−gi(τi)
∑
j∈N\i E[ηj←i] which is non-increasing
by assumption. Hence, the function Hi is concave.
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Learning as stochastic optimization. The previous observations suggest a natural strat-
egy to learn the optimal auction in the observational model described in Section E.1: using
a sequence of posted price mechanisms and iteratively updating the thresholds based on the
buyers’ decisions.
Note that when using a posted price mechanism with threshold τki at time step k, the only
thing we observe from buyer k is her decision to accept or reject the offer, which is the binary
random variable Xki := 1{vki ≥ τki }. Hence, the suggested strategy does not even require the
buyers to report their entire type but simply relies on the binary observations (Xki )i∈N from
each time step. From these observations, one can form for each i ∈ N , the quantity
Hi(τ
k
i , X
k
i ) := τ
k
i − (1−Xki )
(
τki −
∑
j∈N\i
E[ηj←i]
)
which is an unbiased estimate of Hi(τ
k
i ), that is, Hi(τ
k
i ) = E
[
Hi(τ
k
i , X
k
i )].
This observation conveniently reduces the problem of learning the optimal mechanism to
the one of maximizing for each i ∈ N the concave function Hi(·) assuming access to unbiased
estimates of Hi(τ
k
i ) for a sequence τ
k
i of our choice. This problem is exactly what is known in
the online learning literature as a stochastic derivative-free optimization problem where the
quantity Hi(τ
k
i , X
k
i ) plays the role of a zeroth
2 order stochastic oracle.
Algorithms for stochastic derivative-free optimizations usually take the form of iterative
algorithms in which at each time step, the current estimate of the optimal solution is updated
based on the previous estimate and the current observation. In our notations, we write:
τk+1i = Update(τ
k
i , X
k
i )
where Update(·) is the update rule given by a stochastic optimization algorithm. We instantiate
the stochastic optimization framework in our setting and describe in Algorithm 1 a meta
algorithm parametrized by a generic Update function.
All that remains to do to obtain a concrete bound on the regret of our learning procedure
is to choose an Update(·) function from the stochastic optimization literature. Here, we
will not aim for optimal bounds but rather give a simple example of how to instantiate
Algorithm 1. A common idea is to estimate the derivative of the objective Hi at τi by
Hi(τi + δu)u where u is uniformly random over [−1, 1]. Using this estimate of the derivative
in projected gradient-ascent suggests the following simple update rule:
τk+1i = τ
k
i + γ ·Hi(τki + δu,Xki )u , (E.2)
where u is uniformly random over [−1, 1] and γ is the step size parameter. By applying a
standard result (see e.g. [FKM05]) we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition E.2. For any K ≥ 1, there exists a choice of δ and γ such that using the update
rule (E.2) in Algorithm 1 yields a regret R(K) = O(K3/4).
Furthermore, since the revenue is a concave function of the chosen threshold, we recover
the standard fact that a bound on the regret implies a bound on the objective function.
2The stochastic optimization literature distinguishes between first-order stochastic oracles giving unbiased
estimates of the gradient of the objective function and zeroth-order oracles given unbiased estimates of the
objective function itself.
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Algorithm 1: A meta online learning algorithm from single-dimensional stochastic
optimization
Input: vector of initial thresholds τ 1, Update given a stochastic optimization algorithm
for k ≥ 1 do
post vector of thresholds τ k;
collect buyers’ decisions Xki = 1{vki ≥ τki };
for i ∈ N do
if Xki == 1 then
allocate good;
collect payment τki +
∑
j∈N\i E[ηi←j ](1−Xkj );
else
do not allocate good;
collect payment
∑
j∈N\i E[ηi←j ](1−Xkj );
end
τk+1i ← Update(τki , Xki );
end
end
Corollary E.3. Consider the sequence of threshold vectors (τ k)k≥1 computed by Algorithm 1
with update rule (E.2) and define τK :=
1
K
∑K
k=1 τ k for K ≥ 1, and denote by Rev(τK)
obtained by using the posted price mechanism with thresholds τK . Then for any K ≥ 1, there
exists a choice of δ and γ such that:
Rev(τ ?)− Rev(τK) = O
( n
K1/4
)
.
Proof. This follows immediately from Proposition E.2 by application of Jensen’s inequality.
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